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ACTA AND THE SPECTER OF GRADUATED 
RESPONSE 
 
Annemarie Bridy1 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This article considers the evolution of ACTA’s “digital environment” 
provisions in the context of concerns raised early in the negotiations that the 
agreement would require signatories to mandate graduated response 
regimes for online copyright enforcement (à la France’s controversial 
HADOPI system).  The Consolidated Text of ACTA released in October 
2010, following the final round of negotiations in Japan, contains no 
provision mandating the adoption of graduated response.  Such regimes are 
tacitly endorsed in the agreement, however, through language in the 
preamble and the digital environment provisions concerning the promotion 
of greater cooperation between rights owners and service providers. 
Moreover, opponents of graduated response should be wary of the fact that 
public law mechanisms—be they domestic or international—are not the 
only means by which graduated response can effectively become the law for 
Internet users.  The United States and Ireland provide examples of the trend 
toward private ordering in the project of online copyright enforcement. 
                                                 
1
 Associate Professor of Law, University of Idaho College of Law.  The author would 
like to thank Michael Geist, David Post, and Peter Yu for their helpful comments and 
suggestions.  The author would also like to thank Sean Flynn and the Program in 
Information Justice and Intellectual Property at American University for precipitating a 
very necessary public discussion on the public interest implications of ACTA.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
  
Much of the controversy surrounding the secret negotiation of the 
proposed Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) has centered on 
the possibility that the agreement will require signatories to adopt an online 
copyright enforcement regime that requires Internet service providers (ISPs) 
to terminate Internet access for accused repeat copyright infringers.  This 
regime, called “graduated response” or “three strikes,” is at the forefront of 
an international lobbying campaign being waged by corporate copyright 
owners and the trade organizations that represent their interests to 
governments throughout the world.  Groups like the International 
Federation for the Phonographic Industry (IFPI) and the International 
Intellectual Property Alliance (IIPA) have been especially aggressive in 
pressuring individual governments to require ISPs to take an active role in 
policing copyrights online by implementing graduated response protocols.  
Several countries, including the UK, France, South Korea, and Taiwan, 
have already incorporated graduated response into their domestic copyright 
enforcement systems.
2
  Similar legislation is on its way to becoming the law 
                                                 
2
 See Jeremy de Beer and Christopher D. Clemmer, Global Trends in Online Copyright 
Enforcement: A Non-Neutral Role for Network Intermediaries?, 49 JURIMETRICS J. 375 
(2009) (discussing graduated response in France, South Korea, and Taiwan).  The mandate 
in the UK is set forth in the Digital Economy Bill, which became law in April 2010.  See 
Digital Economy Act, 2010, c. 24.  The Act provides that technical measures, including 
protocols for temporary Internet disconnection, may be phased in by the Secretary of State 
if a notice regime set forth in the legislation proves inadequate to reduce the level of online 
infringement.  See Digital Economy Act, Explanatory Notes, Commentary on Sections, 
Topic 2:  Online Infringement of Copyright, available at 
http://legislation.data.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/24/notes/division/5/2/data.pdf, at 1, ¶¶ 33-34. 
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in New Zealand,
3
 although EU countries including Germany and Spain have 
notably demurred.
4
  
Graduated response mandates in the countries that have enacted them do 
not derive from existing international treaty obligations, and it is all but 
certain, based on the draft text released following the eleventh and final 
round of negotiations in Japan, that such mandates will not be included in 
ACTA.  This is, of course, good news for consumer advocates, who 
legitimately worry that three strikes protocols put too much power in the 
hands of corporate copyright owners and, among other shortcomings, fail to 
accommodate fair use/fair dealing exceptions that are built-in to most 
domestic copyright regimes.  The omission of mandatory graduated 
response from the text of ACTA should not, however, be taken as a sign 
that the entertainment industries have failed in their concerted effort to 
globalize graduated response.  On the contrary, the draft of ACTA released 
following the Japan round both accommodates existing graduated response 
mandates and requires signatories to promote the development of voluntary 
graduated response regimes in countries where mandates do not exist.     
 
II. THE (APPARENT) RETREAT FROM GRADUATED RESPONSE 
  
On April 16, 2010, at the conclusion of the eighth round of ACTA 
negotiations in New Zealand, the United States Trade Representative 
(USTR) announced publicly that “no participant is proposing to require 
governments to mandate a ‘graduated response’ or ‘three strikes’ approach 
to copyright infringement on the Internet.”
5
  The official draft text of ACTA 
                                                 
3
 New Zealand’s graduated response mandate is set forth in the Copyright (Infringing 
File Sharing) Amendment Bill, 119-1 (2010), the text of which may be accessed online via 
the New Zealand government’s web site.  See New Zealand Legislation:  Bills, 
http://www.legislation.govt.nz/bill/government/2010/0119/latest/DLM2764312.html.  As it 
was in France, the path to mandatory graduated response in New Zealand is proving to be a 
rocky one.  See, e.g., Pat Pilcher, So Long Section 92A - New Copyright Bill Revealed, Feb. 
24, 2010, NZHERALD.CO.UK (describing the controversy surrounding the implementation of 
graduated response in New Zealand, including the repeal of Section 92A of the Copyright 
Act, and the introduction of more user-friendly legislation in the form of the Copyright 
(Infringing File Sharing) Amendment Bill). 
4
 See Jacqui Cheng, Germany Says "Nein" To Three-Strikes Infringement Plan, ARS 
TECHNICA (Feb. 6, 2009), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2009/02/germany-
walks-away-from-three-strikes-internet-policy.ars; Howell Llewellyn, 'Three-Strikes' Off 
Anti-Piracy Agenda In Spain, BILLBOARD.BIZ (June 22, 2009), 
http://www.billboard.biz/bbbiz/content_display/industry/e3i8071e0d9c25cb6b876d3771fb7
e3d102. 
5
 Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, The Office of the U.S. Trade 
Representative Releases Statement of ACTA Negotiating Partners on Recent ACTA 
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released on April 21, 2010 (“the April draft”) confirmed that mandatory 
graduated response was no longer on the table for the negotiating parties.  
What remained, however, was a more general provision that conditioned 
ISP eligibility for safe harbor from claims of third party infringement on 
“an online service provider’s adopting and reasonably implementing a 
policy to address unauthorized storage or transmission of materials 
protected by copyright.”
6
  Such a policy presumably might, though it 
needn’t necessarily, entail graduated response.   
Readers of the April draft who are familiar with U.S. copyright law 
immediately recognized that the language of the proposed safe harbor 
provision, which was drafted by U.S. negotiators, was strongly evocative of 
section 512(i) of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA)—the so-
called repeat infringer provision.  Section 512(i) requires ISPs seeking safe 
harbor to have “adopted and reasonably implemented . . . a policy that 
provides for the termination in appropriate circumstances of subscribers and 
account holders of the service provider’s systems or networks who are 
repeat infringers.”
7
  
The similarity between the April draft of ACTA and the DMCA was 
even more striking when section 512(i) was juxtaposed with an earlier, 
leaked draft of the agreement, which contained an explanatory footnote 
concerning the specific type of policy that would satisfy the requirement:  
“An example of such a policy is providing for termination in appropriate 
circumstances of subscriptions [and/or] accounts on the service provider’s 
system or network of repeat infringers.”
8
  This footnote was conspicuously 
absent from the April draft, as was any other reference to termination of 
subscribers or account holders who are “repeat infringers.”   
Unlike the previously leaked version of ACTA, the April draft retreated 
entirely from the DMCA’s rhetoric of termination of subscribers and 
account holders—a response, perhaps, to criticism that ACTA’s Internet 
provisions represented little more than an attempt by industry-captured US 
negotiators to export the DMCA to the rest of the world.  Comparing the 
April draft to section 512 of the DMCA revealed that such criticism was 
justified.
9
  The April draft extended safe harbor to the same types of 
                                                                                                                            
Negotiations, Apr. 16, 2010, http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-
releases/2010/april/office-us-trade-representative-releases-statement-ac. 
6
 Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), Consolidated Text Prepared for 
Public Release, Apr. 2010, at 21. 
7
 17 U.S.C. § 512(i). 
8
 Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), Informal Predecisional/Deliberative 
Draft, Jan. 18, 2010, at 28 n.29. 
9
 The similarities do not stop at section 512.  In addition to the safe harbor provisions 
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providers covered by the DMCA and proposed a notice-and-takedown 
regime similar in broad outline to the DMCA’s.
10
   
There were competing proposals in the April draft concerning the 
appropriate source of a takedown notice: one version required a “legally 
sufficient notice,” which presumably could come from a rights owner, as 
notices deemed effective under section 512(c) of the DMCA do.
11
  Another 
version required “receipt of an order from a competent authority,” which 
implies an official, governmental source.
12
  The latter proposal also 
suggested the necessity for a disinterested adjudication of some kind prior 
to any enforcement action.  No such safeguard is required by the DMCA 
before content is taken down or, for that matter, before a user’s account 
access is terminated by a provider pursuant to section 512(i).  By contrast, a 
form of due process is required prior to the imposition of access sanctions 
under the Internet Freedom Provision of the 2009 EU Telecoms Reform.
13
  
Due process is also a component of Création et Internet, France’s graduated 
response law, which (as amended) requires judicial review of disconnection 
decisions that are made initially by HADOPI, the special administrative 
entity created to implement the graduated response system.
14
   
To ensure that statutory enforcement regimes like France’s would not be 
disrupted or pre-empted by ACTA, there was a proposed provision in the 
April draft—presented as an alternative to the U.S.-drafted, DMCA-like 
                                                                                                                            
for ISPs, ACTA contains provisions that prohibit the circumvention of technological 
protection measures (i.e, digital rights management or DRM) that control access to and 
copying of copyrighted works.  These provisions bear an unmistakable resemblance to 
section 1201 of the DMCA. 
10
 Compare ACTA Consolidated Text, Apr. 2010, supra note 6, at 19-20 with 17 USC. 
§§ 512(a)-(d). 
11
 ACTA Consolidated Text, Apr. 2010, supra note 6, at 21; see also 17 USC. §§ 
512(c)(3)(A) (defining the elements of an “effective” notification from a rights owner or 
his/her authorized agent). 
12
 ACTA Consolidated Text, Apr. 2010, supra note 6, at 21. 
13
 The Internet Freedom Provision, Article 1(3)a of the new Framework Directive, 
provides that sanctions involving Internet access must be “appropriate, proportionate and 
necessary within a democratic society, and their implementation shall be subject to 
adequate procedural safeguards…, including effective judicial protection and due process.” 
Press Release, EU Telecoms Commissioner, EU Telecoms Reform: 12 Reforms to Pave 
Way for Stronger Consumer Rights, an Open Internet, a Single European Telecoms Market 
and High-Speed Internet Connections for All Citizens (Nov. 20, 2009).  Under Article 
1(3)a, Internet users are entitled to a presumption of innocence in proceedings involving 
accusations of copyright infringement.  Id.   
14
 See Code de la propriété intellectuelle L. 331-21; see also Constitutional Council, 
Decision n˚ 2009-590 DC (October 22, 2009).  The original version of the law, which did 
not require judicial review, was struck down by France’s Constitutional Council. 
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notice-and-takedown provision—stipulating that ACTA’s safe harbor 
provisions “shall not affect the possibility of a judicial or administrative 
authority, in accordance with the Parties [sic] legal system, requiring the 
service provider to terminate or prevent an infringement.”
15
  The proposed 
language avoided any reference to disconnection or termination of 
infringers, although the phrase “terminate or prevent an infringement” 
could be read to encompass termination of Internet access, pursuant to a 
governmentally defined protocol, for repeat infringers.
16
 
The commonalities between the April draft and the DMCA did not end 
at the definition of safe harbors for ISPs.  The April draft, like the DMCA, 
provided for the identification of alleged infringers outside the litigation 
context.
17
  Like the DMCA, the April draft attempted to be responsive to the 
concerns of ISPs and privacy advocates by expressly excluding a general 
network monitoring or policing requirement.
18
  In addition, the April draft 
contained anti-circumvention provisions similar to those found in section 
1201 of the DMCA, including section 1201’s controversial anti-trafficking 
provisions, which ban the dissemination of technologies for circumventing 
technological protection measures employed by rights owners.
19
  With 
respect to the proposed anti-circumvention provisions, there was a footnote 
in the April draft indicating a lack of consensus on the issue among 
negotiators:  “At least one delegation has reservations about several 
elements” of the proposed terms.
20
 
The official release of the April draft at the close of the eighth round in 
New Zealand confirmed for the public at large what was being reported by 
commentators close to the process:  going into the ninth round of 
negotiations in Luzerne, the provisions of the Internet chapter, even stripped 
of references to account termination for repeat infringers, remained divisive; 
consensus on the DMCA-like secondary liability and anti-circumvention 
                                                 
15
 ACTA Consolidated Text, Apr. 2010, supra note 6, at 21. 
16
 The language of this alternate provision is very similar to language in the EU 
Directive on Electronic Commerce concerning the availability of injunctive relief against 
ISPs in cases involving online copyright infringement:  “The limitations of liability of 
intermediary service providers…do not affect the possibility of orders by courts or 
administrative authorities…requiring the termination or prevention of any infringement.…” 
Directive on Electronic Commerce at § 45. 
17
 Compare ACTA Consolidated Text, Apr. 2010, supra note 6, at 21 with 17 U.S.C. § 
512(h). 
18
 Compare ACTA Consolidated Text, Apr. 2010, supra note 6, at 21 with 17 U.S.C. § 
512(m).   
19
 Compare ACTA Consolidated Text, Apr. 2010, supra note 6, at 22-24 with 17 
U.S.C. § 1201. 
20
 ACTA Consolidated Text, Apr. 2010, supra note 6, at 23 n.59. 
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provisions was proving elusive.
21
  This was true in no small part because 
the imposition of secondary liability required by provisions in the April 
draft would represent a change in substantive intellectual property law for 
some parties.
22
  The April draft thus demonstrated ACTA’s potential to 
function as a back door for policymaking, through which more expansive 
substantive rights were being sneaked in under the guise of better-
coordinated enforcement.
23
   
Given the persistence of the parties’ disagreement over the scope and 
substance of the Internet provisions, and the USTR’s publicly stated goal of 
concluding the agreement expeditiously, the most controversial elements of 
the Internet chapter were excised by the end of the tenth round in 
Washington, DC.  At the close of the round, in August 2010, an updated 
version of the consolidated text was leaked, and the consensus-thwarting 
secondary liability provisions were gone, along with the safe harbor 
framework designed to mitigate their impact on ISPs.
24
  A contemporaneous 
                                                 
21
 See, e.g., Posting of Nate Anderson to ARS TECHNICA, ACTA Arrives (Still Bad, But 
a Tiny Bit Better), Apr. 21, 2010, http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2010/04/acta-is-
here.ars/3 (discussing the international climate for ACTA on the eve of the Luzerne round). 
22
 See, e.g., Blog Posting of Michael Geist, Has the US Caved on Secondary Liability 
in ACTA?, Aug. 26, 2010, http://www.michaelgeist.ca/content/view/5273/125/ (“Secondary 
liability has proven consistently problematic, however, since many ACTA countries deal 
with the issue in different ways.”); Lynda J. Oswald, International Issues in Secondary 
Liability for Intellectual Property Rights Infringement, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 247, 251-252 
(2008) (“The considerable diversity in global thought on the issue of secondary liability for 
intellectual property rights infringement highlights the important fact that not all 
participants in discussion of this topic start from the same place in terms of legal theory and 
practice.”). 
23
 Chapter One of ACTA provides that “[t]his agreement shall be without prejudice to 
provisions governing the availability, acquisition, scope, and maintenance of intellectual 
property rights contained in a Party’s law.” ACTA Consolidated Text, Informal 
Predecisional/Deliberative Draft, Aug. 2010, at 3.  Commentators have pointed out, 
however, that many of the provisions proposed in the April draft do affect substantive 
rights.  See Press Release, American University Washington College of Law Program on 
Intellectual Property and Information Justice (PIJIP), Text of Urgent ACTA Communiqué: 
International Experts Find that Pending Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement Threatens 
Public Interests, June 23, 2010, http://www.wcl.american.edu/pijip/go/acta-communique 
(“What started as a relatively simple proposal to coordinate customs enforcement has 
transformed into a sweeping and complex new international intellectual property and 
internet regulation….”).   
24
 What remained was a general provision requiring that “[e]ach party’s enforcement 
procedures shall provide the means to address the infringement of {US: copyright or 
related rights}{EU/J: intellectual property rights} in the digital environment, including 
infringement that occurs via technologies {US: or services} that can be used to facilitate 
widespread infringement.”  ACTA Consolidated Text, Informal Predecisional/Deliberative 
Draft, Aug. 25, 2010, at 19.  A footnote singled out unlawful file sharing and unlawful 
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USTR press release asserting that ACTA “is not intended to include new 
intellectual property rights or to enlarge…existing intellectual property 
rights”
25
 hinted at the impetus for the changes. 
Not all of the controversial DMCA-like provisions were eliminated by 
the end of the tenth round, however.  Still in the mix going into the 
eleventh—and final—round of negotiations in Japan were controversial 
provisions concerning ISP identification of alleged online infringers
26
 and 
anti-circumvention.
27
  The proposed anti-circumvention provisions 
continued to include a requirement, backed by the US but opposed by the 
EU, that violations be actionable even without any nexus to copyright 
infringement.
28
  
By the time negotiations entered the final round, in September 2010, it 
was apparent to those who had been following the process and comparing 
successive drafts of the agreement that US aspirations for very aggressive 
Internet and intermediary liability provisions had been incrementally 
disappointed.  The language of the agreement with respect to the digital 
environment had evolved, as a result of pressure from both within and 
outside the formal process, to be more protective of the parties’ sovereign 
prerogatives in areas relating to substantive rights, liabilities, and 
exceptions.  The text of the agreement released officially after the final 
round (“the October draft”) provides further evidence of this trend:  it 
altogether omits the U.S.-backed provision requiring parties to make 
circumventions actionable per se.
29
  
 
III. THE (ACTUAL) PERSISTENCE OF GRADUATED RESPONSE 
 
Although the absence of any reference to repeat infringers in the April 
and October drafts may give the impression that graduated response is not 
                                                                                                                            
streaming as examples of such technologies or services.  Id. at n.29.  Also included in the 
new provision was a mandate to implement the procedures “in a manner that avoids the 
creation of barriers to legitimate activity.” Id. at 19.   
25
 Press Release, Office of the US Trade Representative, Statement of ACTA 
Negotiating Partners on Recent ACTA Negotiations, Aug. 20, 2010, 
http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-releases/2010/august. 
26
 In the August 2010 leaked text, however, the provision is no longer mandatory. 
Compare ACTA Consolidated Text, Apr. 2010, supra note 6, at 21 (provision 3 ter.) with 
ACTA Consolidated Text, Aug. 2010, supra note 24, at 21 (provision 4). 
27
 Compare ACTA Consolidated Text, Apr. 2010, supra note 6, at 23 (provision 5) 
with ACTA Consolidated Text, Aug. 2010, supra note 24, at 21 (provision 7). 
28
 ACTA Consolidated Text, Aug. 2010, supra note 24, at 21. 
29
 Compare ACTA Consolidated Text, Aug. 2010, supra note 24, at 21 with ACTA 
Consolidated Text, Informal Predecisional/Deliberative Draft, Oct. 2, 2010, at 16-17. 
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part of the enforcement framework contemplated by ACTA, this is only 
superficially true.  The April draft contained an allusive provision requiring 
signatories to pressure ISPs to cooperate with rights owners:   
 
Each party shall promote the development of mutually 
supportive relationships between online service providers 
and rights holders to deal effectively with…copyright and 
related rights infringement which takes place by means of 
the Internet, including the encouragement of establishing 
guidelines for the actions which should be taken.
30
   
 
This mandatory provision remains—albeit in qualified form—in the 
October draft:  
 
Each party shall endeavor to promote cooperative efforts 
within the business community to effectively address at least 
trademark and copyright or related rights infringement while 
preserving legitimate competition and consistent with each 
Party’s law, preserving fundamental principles such as 
freedom of expression, fair process, and privacy.
31
 
 
Moreover, in the October draft, for the first time, a statement concerning 
ISP cooperation with rights owners appears in the agreement’s preamble: 
 
The Parties to this Agreement…[d]esiring to promote 
cooperation between service providers and rights holders 
with respect to relevant infringement in the digital 
environment…[a]gree as follows:…
32
 
 
Positioned at the beginning of the agreement, this statement foregrounds the 
principle on which graduated response is founded:  ISPs and rights owners 
should be collaborating more closely in the project of online copyright 
enforcement.  
The notion that ISPs should be encouraged by government to work with 
rights holders is reminiscent of the DMCA, which was drafted, according to 
the statute’s legislative history, to “preserve strong incentives for service 
providers and copyright owners to cooperate to detect and deal with 
                                                 
30
 ACTA Consolidated Text, Apr. 2010, supra note 6, at 22. 
31
 ACTA Consolidated Text, Oct. 2010, supra note 29, at 15. 
32
 Id. at 2.   
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copyright infringements that take place in the digital networked 
environment.”
33
  The formalization of such cooperative relationships 
appears on the IIPA’s 2010 global copyright policy wish list:  “The 
copyright industries look to governments to…encourage cooperation by 
Internet service providers with all content owners, including workable and 
fair notice and takedown systems and graduated response mechanisms to 
deal with repeat infringers.”
34
   
Even though ACTA does not mandate graduated response or require 
disconnection for repeat infringers, and even though the October draft 
contains no notice and takedown provision, the language requiring 
governments to take affirmative action to “promote cooperation” between 
rights owners and ISPs resonates strongly with the industries’ demand that 
ISPs take a more active role in anti-piracy efforts.  The industries’ 
international strategy has been to seek government mandates for graduated 
response where such mandates seem politically achievable and to accept 
government pressure for graduated response where mandates are too 
controversial to win legislative approval.  This strategy of compelled 
“voluntary” collaboration comes directly from the playbook of the IFPI, 
which advocates “government-backed systems of ISP cooperation” and 
asserts that “government pressure is crucial to producing collective action 
by all ISPs.”
35
   
Consistent with the IIPA’s and the IFPI’s rhetoric, rights owners have 
increasingly come to define “mutually supportive relationships” and 
“cooperation” between themselves and ISPs in terms of ISPs’ willingness to 
embrace graduated response.  This is so much the case that “cooperation” 
for the copyright industries has come to function as a sort of code word for 
graduated response.  Insofar as the October draft of ACTA requires parties 
to “endeavor to promote cooperative efforts within the business 
community,” the agreement retains an implicit, sub-textual appeal for global 
graduated response.   
The cooperative relationships that industries seek are now developing in 
many places through market forces and without government pressure, 
however, which casts doubt on the need for a provision in ACTA requiring 
official pressure.  A propos of this development, opponents of graduated 
response should be mindful that public law—be it international or 
domestic—is not the only vehicle through which graduated response 
                                                 
33
 H. Rep. 105-796, at 72 (1998). 
34
 IIPA, Copyright Industries’ Global Challenges and Solutions for 2010, 
http://www.iipa.com/pdf/2010Special301Challenges.pdf. 
35
IFPI, Digital Music Report 2009, 
http://www.ifpi.org/content/section_resources/dmr2009.html, at 24.  
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regimes can be implemented.  The United States and Ireland provide 
instructive examples of how graduated response can effectively become the 
law for Internet users without ever becoming the law of the land. 
 
A. Privately Ordered Graduated Response in the U.S. 
 
Whereas the entertainment industry’s campaign in Europe and countries 
abroad has focused on government-mandated graduated response, the 
campaign in the US has focused on inter-industry negotiations and 
technology-based solutions capable of private implementation.  Believing 
that the DMCA has failed them as a weapon in the domestic war on piracy, 
right owners in the U.S. market have set their sights on an enforcement 
regime that operates on Internet users through a combination of technology 
and private law mechanisms such as standardized terms of service and 
acceptable use policies.
36
 
There are a number of reasons why U.S.-based ISPs are more receptive 
now than they were in the past to overtures from rights owners.  There is a 
growing sense among ISPs that there’s actually something in it for them if 
they agree to work more cooperatively with rights owners.  For example, 
Verizon agreed in 2005 to forward notices of infringement to its customers 
for Disney, in return for which it received the right to transmit Disney 
programming over its network.
37
  These types of business arrangements are 
likely to become more common as distribution of non-amateur content over 
the Internet increases.  Music, movies, and TV shows that were once only 
broadcast are now also streamed, which means that ISPs now mediate the 
consumption of corporate-produced entertainment in ways they never did 
before.  As a result of the rise of streaming media over broadband, 
traditional lines of demarcation between corporate producers of content and 
corporate distributors of content are blurring.  The proposed merger 
between Comcast and NBC Universal is a prime example.  If the deal 
between these two juggernauts survives antitrust scrutiny, it may become 
the wave of the future, forever transforming the historical relationship 
between the major corporations that deliver content over the Internet and 
the major corporations that own the intellectual property rights in that 
content.  When (or if) the corporate distributors of content become its 
                                                 
36
 For a full discussion of this shift in enforcement strategy, see Annemarie Bridy, 
Graduated Response and the Turn to Private Ordering in Online Copyright Enforcement, 
89 OR. L. REV. ___ (forthcoming 2010). 
37
 See Posting of Nate Anderson to ARS TECHNICA, Verizon to Forward RIAA Warning 
Letters (But That's All), Nov. 13, 2009, http://arstechnica.com/tech-
policy/news/2009/11/verizon-to-forward-riaa-warning-letters-but-thats-all.ars. 
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owners, their stake in the copyright enforcement game will change—
radically. 
ISPs have also realized the extent to which peer-to-peer (P2P) file-
sharing traffic, most of which is attributable to copyright infringement, 
causes congestion on their networks.  A key element of the negotiation 
strategy for rights owners seeking to partner with US broadband providers 
in the implementation of a network-level solution to online piracy has been 
the assertion that management of P2P traffic should be regarded as a matter 
of mutual concern.  The message has not fallen on deaf ears.  Comcast’s 
highly controversial use of deep packet inspection technology to throttle 
BitTorrent traffic in 2007 is one manifestation of the coincidental 
community of interest that has developed between rights owners and 
network operators. 
Given users’ resistance to the idea that that their ISPs will begin 
functioning actively as the entertainment industry’s enforcement agents, 
ISPs are cagey when it comes to publicizing the nature of their cooperative 
relationships with major content distributors.  To comply with section 
512(i) of the DMCA, every major broadband provider in the US includes in 
its terms of use a provision reserving the right to terminate access for any 
user who repeatedly infringes copyrights.
38
  Verizon and Comcast expressly 
reserve the right to do so unilaterally (i.e., in their “sole discretion”).  
Representatives of major broadband providers including Comcast, Cox, and 
AT&T have denied publicly that they are participating in a “three strikes” 
                                                 
38
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http://www.verizon.net/policies/popups/tos_popup.asp (“In accordance with the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) and other applicable laws, it is the policy of Verizon 
to suspend or terminate, in appropriate circumstances, the Service provided to any 
subscriber or account holder who is deemed to infringe third party intellectual property 
rights, including repeat infringers of copyrights. In addition, Verizon expressly reserves the 
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program in cooperation with the RIAA.
39
  At the same time, however, a 
Comcast executive disclosed that the company issues between one and two 
million infringement notices per year to subscribers on behalf of copyright 
owners.
40
  He also acknowledged that Comcast has suspended the accounts 
of a small fraction of users in connection with the company’s DMCA 
compliance efforts.
41
  Cox representatives have admitted to having done the 
same in a small number of cases where repeated notices have gone 
unheeded by subscribers.
42
 
Although the impulse of broadband executives is to deny involvement 
when they are confronted with questions from the media about “three 
strikes” and graduated response,
43
 the fact of the matter is that US 
broadband providers, in the name of DMCA compliance, have been 
engaged for a number of years in a form of graduated response:  They have 
entered into arrangements with rights owners pursuant to which they 
forward notices of infringement to subscribers, and at least two major 
ISPs—Comcast and Cox—are on the record as having suspended access for 
subscribers who routinely receive and ignore such notices.  Such 
suspensions, which occur without a court order or a judgment of 
infringement, are permitted under the terms of use to which all subscribers 
must agree in order to initiate and maintain broadband service.  Although it 
is impossible to gauge with any accuracy to what extent U.S. ISPs are 
currently cooperating with rights owners in online copyright enforcement, 
they could be doing so quite extensively without any required disclosure 
and without running afoul of their existing contractual agreements with 
their customers. 
 
B. Privately Ordered Graduated Response in Ireland 
 
Ireland provides another example of privately ordered online copyright 
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enforcement.  Graduated response has become the de facto law for over 
40% of that country’s broadband subscribers through a legal settlement 
between a major ISP—Eircom—and major music and movie distributors 
(EMI, Sony BMG, Universal, and Warner), which sued Eircom for 
copyright infringement.  After eight days of trial on the merits of the 
plaintiffs’ claims, the parties agreed to a settlement that requires Eircom to 
implement a graduated response protocol.
44
  The case never went to 
judgment on its merits. 
The “three strikes” protocol adopted by the parties is described in detail 
in an Irish High Court decision issued in the context of an unsuccessful 
legal challenge to the settlement.
45
  Upon receiving a first notice of 
infringement from a computer security firm hired by the plaintiffs, Eircom 
informs its allegedly infringing customer that s/he has been caught in the act 
of illegal uploading or downloading.  This first warning is included with the 
customer’s monthly bill.  Upon receipt of a second notice of infringement 
by the same customer, Eircom sends a separate letter to the customer that 
contains a strongly worded warning.  The response escalates from the first 
level to the second level only if fourteen days or more have passed since the 
first infringement was detected.  Upon receipt of a third notice from the 
computer security firm, Eircom must review all of the evidence against its 
customer.  As with the escalation from the first level of response to the 
second, fourteen days or more must have passed for the response to 
graduate to the third level.  The first two notices are generated 
automatically; the third notice, however, triggers a human review.  
Following human review, a notice of termination is sent to the customer, 
who is given fourteen days to respond.  Eircom considers the response, if 
any is received, in light of any extenuating circumstances the customer 
raises.  If the customer claims in his or her response that there was a 
mistake of fact concerning the alleged infringements, Eircom considers that 
claim as well.  If there is no finding in favor of the customer, the customer’s 
Internet service is cut off.
 
No court order is required; the ISP is the sole 
arbiter of the customer’s innocence or guilt.  
The legal challenge to the EMI-Eircom settlement involved a claim that 
the computer security firm’s collection of Internet protocol addresses, and 
its subsequent disclosure of those addresses to Eircom, violated Ireland’s 
Data Protection Acts.  After considering each of the arguments raised by the 
settlement’s opponents, the judge concluded that the process is lawful and 
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approved implementation of the settlement.
46
  With his decision, graduated 
response became the law, entirely outside the parliamentary process, for 
every one of Eircom’s 560,000 customers.
47
 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
At the close of the official negotiations, looking back on the round-by-
round evolution of ACTA’s terms, it seems safe to say that the Internet 
provisions were among the agreement’s most contested and heavily 
negotiated.  References to repeat infringers and account termination were 
edited out of the agreement well before the final round of negotiations, and 
with them went the prospect of mandatory graduated response.  Related 
provisions requiring secondary liability for ISPs and a DMCA-like safe 
harbor framework also fell away, albeit later in the game.  
Before breathing a sigh of relief, however, opponents of graduated 
response should think twice about the possible implications of the provision 
in the October draft that requires governments to “endeavor to promote 
cooperative efforts” between rights owners and ISPs.  Through this 
amorphous provision, ISPs could be subject to various forms of 
governmental pressure to capitulate to copyright owners’ demands for 
privately implemented graduated response regimes.  For lawmakers who 
would rather not place themselves at the center of the controversy over 
graduated response, private ordering with a government push may prove 
more palatable than outright government mandates, which prompted very 
vocal public resistance and dissent in places like France and the UK.  Like 
the negotiation of ACTA itself, officially required private ordering 
represents a species of policymaking that is insulated from public scrutiny 
and that can be tailored, by virtue of that insulation, to serve the interests of 
business at the public’s expense.    
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